Global Justice and the Role of the State: A Critical Survey by Valentini, Laura & Ronzoni, Miriam
	 1 
Global Justice and the Role of the State: 
A Critical Survey  
 
Miriam Ronzoni (Manchester) & 
Laura Valentini (LSE) 
 
For citations, please refer to the published version 
 
 
Abstract: Reference to the state is ubiquitous in debates about global justice. Some 
authors see the state as central to the justification of principles of justice, and thereby 
reject their extension to the international realm. Others emphasize its role in the 
implementation of those principles. This chapter scrutinizes the variety of ways in 
which the state figures in the global-justice debate. Our discussion suggests that, 
although the state should have a prominent role in theorizing about global justice, 
contrary to what is commonly thought, acknowledging this role does not lead to anti-
cosmopolitan conclusions, but to the defense of an “intermediate” position about 
global justice. From a justificatory perspective, we argue, the state remains a key 
locus for the application of egalitarian principles of justice, but is not the only one. 
From the perspective of implementation, we suggest that state institutions are 
increasingly fragile in a heavily interdependent world, and need to be supplemented—
though not supplanted—with supranational authorities. 
 




The role of the state in our age of deep political, economic, and cultural 
interdependence is heavily debated in political science. While some see globalization 
as marking the decline of the state as a form of political organization, others see the 
state as the engine of globalization and its main beneficiary (see, e.g., Evans 1997; 
Hirst and Thompson 1995; Gritsch 2005; Weiss 1998; 2003). 
Similarly debated is the role of the state in normative political theory, and 
particularly in the context of disputes about the scope of justice, namely about its 
proper domain of application. Some theorists see the state as the key domain within 
which demanding principles of justice apply, and an important vehicle for their 
fulfilment. Other scholars insist that the scope of justice is global, and consider the 
state (at least partly) inimical to its realization. But what exactly do normative 
theorists have in mind when they invoke the state? And do their appeals to it 
genuinely serve the argumentative purposes for which they are intended? 
 Our aim in this chapter is to offer both a systematic account, and a critical 
appraisal, of appeals to the state in the global-justice literature.1 Our contribution is 
threefold. First, we provide a survey of the different roles played by the state in 
contemporary debates about global justice. Second, we identify two particularly 
relevant conceptualizations of the state underpinning those different roles. Finally, we 																																																								
1 By “global-justice literature,” here, we mean the literature debating the scope, content, grounds and 
application of principles of justice in particular. We do not discuss the role of the state in other, 
important areas of international normative theory: e.g., debates about territorial rights, self-
determination, humanitarian intervention, and just war. 
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critically assess whether the state, in these different conceptualizations, can justifiably 
play the argumentative roles contemporary theorists of global justice have assigned to 
it. 
 The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1, we distinguish between two 
conceptualizations of the state: institutional and agential. In Section 2, we turn to the 
global-justice debate, and differentiate between two levels of argument at which the 
state is often invoked: the first concerns the justification of principles of justice (i.e., 
their scope and their content), the second their realization. In Section 3, we critically 
examine the roles played by the state at the justificatory level of argument, 
specifically as (i) a ground of justice, (ii) an agent of justice, and (iii) a recipient of 
justice. In so doing, we also illustrate some of the implications of understanding the 
state in institutional or agential terms, respectively. Section 4 offers a very brief 
discussion of the role of the state in the realization of global justice.  
 We reach the following conclusions. From a justificatory perspective, even if 
we grant that appeals to the state play some role in determining the scope and/or 
content of principles of justice, they do not succeed in limiting their reach to the 
domestic realm. Compelling reasons for applying some fairly demanding standards of 
justice beyond borders—though perhaps not identical to those that hold inside them—
survive critical scrutiny. From the perspective of realization, our verdict is equally 
balanced. We suggest that, if we want to realize justice, the state—while remaining a 
major actor on the global plane—is in need of reform and supplementation regardless 
which view of the scope of justice one holds. 
Overall, then, our analysis points in the direction of what are sometimes called 
“intermediate” approaches to global justice—namely approaches that, while 
acknowledging the importance of the state, advocate (i) fairly demanding principles 
of justice beyond borders, though weaker than those that apply at the state level, and 
(ii) the establishment of supra-national institutional agents—coexisting with states—
capable of acting on those principles. 
  
1. The state and how it can matter 
Conceptualizations of the state vary widely. Some follow Max Weber (1919/1994, 
310–11) and see it as an entity successfully claiming monopoly over the legitimate 
use of coercive force. Others conceive of the state as a particular set of institutions, 
including an executive, a legislature, a judiciary, and a permanent military. Others 
still think of the state as a “node” within a broader international system (for overviews 
see Jessop 2008; Morris 2011).   
Offering a defence of a particular account of the state is a task that goes 
beyond the scope of this paper. Here, we limit ourselves to distinguishing two families 
of accounts, particularly prominent in contemporary political theory, which we call 
“institutional” and “agential.” These two perspectives are not mutually exclusive.  
 
1.1 The institutional account 
In the words of March and Olsen (2008, 3): “An institution is a relatively enduring 
collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and 
resources […].” On the institutional account, the state is a complex set of such rules 
and practices clustered around different functions. They include legislatures, 
executives, judiciary organs, armies, and bureaucracies. Each of these institutions is 
constituted by a set of rules, and distributes particular roles to individuals. 
 This institutional perspective is rather prominent in contemporary political 
theory. Its popularity originates in John Rawls’s famous claim that the subject of 
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justice is the basic structure of society. Rawls defines the basic structure as “the way 
in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and 
determine the division of advantages from social cooperation” (Rawls 1999a, 6). He 
specifies that those institutions include society’s political constitution and its main 
socio-economic arrangements, and are appropriately regarded as the subject of justice 
because their “effects are so profound and present from the start” (Rawls 1999a, 7). 
  When the state is conceptualized as a set of institutions—as in the above-
quoted passages from Rawls—it is a structure rather than an agent. This structure 
might matter to individual agents either in its own right or instrumentally (or both). In 
the former case, the state matters insofar as it structures and crystallizes a complex set 
of relationships between its inhabitants; in the same way in which the institutions of 
friendship and the family are often thought to matter because they constitute valuable 
relationships. In the latter case, the state matters as a means to an end. The institutions 
constituting it are created to achieve certain goals that could not be realized in their 
absence, such as the delivery of justice, the preservation of security, or the provision 
of public goods.  
  
1.2 The agential account 
From a different, holistic perspective, the state may also be conceptualized as an 
agent. This suggestion is both unsurprising and puzzling. It is unsurprising because 
we often talk about the state as if it was a unitary agent, such as when we say: “The 
U.S. has signed a treaty” or “Russia has annexed Crimea.” It is puzzling because it is 
hard to see how a complex collective entity like the state can be an agent in the 
familiar sense, i.e., have its own will, identity, and intentions. Without an answer to 
this question, references to the state as an agent are no more than metaphors.  
 List and Pettit (2011) have recently provided one such answer. An agent, on 
their account, is a system that can be best interpreted as having beliefs and desires, 
and as acting on those beliefs in order to satisfy its desires. So characterized, an agent 
must possess (i) an internal deliberative structure, capable of producing beliefs, 
desires, and making decisions to act on their basis and (ii) the ability to translate such 
deliberations into “external” actions (e.g., through bodily movements). When an 
entity’s deliberative capacities are complex enough that it can understand and act on 
moral reasons, it counts not merely as an agent, but as a moral agent. Competent 
individual human beings clearly meet the conditions for both agency simpliciter and 
moral agency. Theorists of group agency claim, somewhat controversially, that so do 
some collectives: from universities to firms, from multinational corporations to 
newspapers (List and Pettit 2011; see also Tuomela 2013; French 1984; Collins and 
Lawford-Smith forthcoming). 
 Crucially, for our purposes, many existing states meet the aforementioned 
conditions for agency simpliciter as well as moral agency.2 First, many states possess 
complex decision-making structures, responsible for the formation of collective 
beliefs and desires. Those decision-making structures are typically sophisticated 
enough to be responsive to moral reasons. Second, many states possess the ability to 
translate their deliberations and decisions into external actions, either through the 
authoritativeness of their directives or through coercion. In other words, the nature of 
the institutions constitutive of (many existing) states allows us to take an agential 																																																								
2 We say “many,” as opposed to “all,” insofar as some states—e.g., weak or failed states—may 
partially or fully fail to meet the relevant conditions. Whether all functioning states meet these 
conditions is an issue on which we shall remain silent here.  
	 4 
perspective towards them, to regard them as (collective) moral agents in their own 
right.  
 It is important to point out that not all institutional systems possess the 
qualities necessary to make the agential perspective available. For example, the 
market is an institution. It is constituted by relatively stable “rules and organized 
practices.” Yet the nature of the rules constituting it does not allow us to 
conceptualize the market as an agent in its own right. The market, after all, does not 
possess centralized decision-making and implementation mechanisms. Taking an 
agential perspective towards the market is thus not theoretically warranted.  
 When the state is conceptualized as an agent in its own right, it may be 
deemed to be valuable for its own sake, as a means to some other end, or both. The 
same reflections advanced on the value of the state as a set of institutions, therefore, 
also apply here. Interestingly, however, when the state is conceptualized as a 
collective agent, it can in principle acquire additional morally relevant features, which 
are unavailable in the case of non-agential structures. It can, for instance, qualify as a 
duty-bearer or a right-holder. 
Having laid out two perspectives on the state, let us now turn to the debate on 
global justice, and the roles that the state, in either of these conceptualizations, plays 
in it.  
 
2. The state and the (global) justice debate 
Justice is perhaps the most-discussed notion in contemporary political theory. In this 
section, we first clarify what we mean by justice, and then map out the different roles 
the state plays within the debate on global justice more specifically. 
 
2.1 Justice: domestic and global 
For present purposes, we understand justice as designating a special type of moral 
concern, one that gives rise to what Wesley Hohfeld (1917) called “claim rights,” 
correlative to obligations. Duties of justice, that is, are “directed duties,” owed to their 
recipients.3 
This formal characterization of justice is still too broad for our purposes. Here 
we are specifically concerned with a subset of rights, namely those that have to be 
secured for a socio-political system to qualify as just.4 Socio-political justice, in turn, 
comprises two categories of rights: substantive and procedural. Substantive rights 
guarantee access to relevant goods, including individual freedoms as well as socio-
economic resources. Procedural rights provide entitlements to decision-making, to 
participating in defining the system of substantive rights one is subjected to.  
It is important to emphasize that, by defining justice in these terms, we both 
exclude some domains from our analysis—e.g., we exclude “justice in the private 
realm”—and include others. Socio-political justice as we understand it encompasses, 
for instance, classical concerns of both “socio-economic” justice (e.g., Which socio-
economic inequalities, if any, are justified?) and “political” justice (e.g., What is a just 
distribution of political power?). 
 Civil, political and socio-economic rights are widely acknowledged as crucial 
to the justice of domestic political systems: of states. A just state, many contemporary 																																																								
3 Justice so construed is often contrasted with charity or beneficence. See, e.g., Barry (1991) and 
Buchanan (1987). 
4 In other words, we ignore other categories of rights, such as those generated by friendship, promising 
and personal or professional relationships more generally. 
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theorists hold, is one that grants its members equal individual freedoms, equal access 
to socio-economic opportunities, and equal rights to political participation.5  
Over the past four decades it has become increasingly evident that the global 
realm is also a complex rule-governed system, and arguably one that is susceptible to 
justice-based assessments. Recognition of this fact is behind the burgeoning debate on 
global justice. Much of this debate revolves around two questions. The first asks 
whether we may evaluate the global realm by reference to the same standards that we 
routinely employ at the domestic level, or whether some, if not all, principles of 
justice are scope-restricted. The second asks how justice can best be realized. In other 
words, the debate includes two levels of argument: one concerns the justification of 
principles of justice (i.e., their scope and content), the other their realization.  
 
2.2 Global justice and the state  
At the justificatory level, different theories of global justice offer different substantive 
principles requiring the fulfilment of specific sets of rights beyond the state. The 
principles in question share the following structure: 
 
Right-holder (R) is entitled to certain objects (O) against duty-bearer (D) on 
grounds (G). 
 
While sharing a commitment to normative individualism—that is, to the role of 
individuals as ultimate units of moral concern, entitled to the social conditions to lead 
autonomous lives—theorists of global justice are divided between those who believe 
that the state plays no role at this justificatory level, and those who believe it does. 
The former are so-called “cosmopolitans” who, for a variety of reasons, see the state 
as irrelevant to the determination of the scope and content of principles of justice.6 
For them, none of the parameters in our four-place relation may be specified by 
reference to the state (see, e.g., Caney 2005; Beitz 1983; Goodin 1988; Pogge 1989).  
The latter are an internally diverse group, ranging from so-called “statists,” to 
“internationalists,” to “transnationalists,” and others (see, e.g., Nagel 2005; Blake 
2001; Sangiovanni 2007; Risse 2006; Ronzoni 2009; Forst 2001; Valentini 2011; 
Meckled-Garcia 2008). For them, the state constitutes an appropriate specification of 
one or more of the parameters characterizing our four-place relation: a right-holder 
(recipient of justice/R), a duty-bearer (agent of justice/D), a ground of justice in 
general (G) and/or a ground of specific principles of justice with particularly 
demanding, egalitarian content (i.e., principles with a distinctive object O).7  
It is important to emphasize that theorists belonging to the latter group diverge 
widely with respect to both: (i) the specific justificatory role they attribute to the state, 
and (ii) whether they regard the state as the only factor determining the scope and 
content of justice. For instance, some believe that states are themselves right-holders 
and/or duty-bearers; others do not. Some, most prominently Thomas Nagel (2005), 
ostensibly hold that obligations of justice arise only within the state. Others insist that 
there are additional grounds of justice—e.g., common humanity, common ownership 
of the earth, the global trade system, the international human rights regime etc.—																																																								
5 Of course, there are exceptions to this general statement, but at least liberal-egalitarian theorists 
(despite their differences) all appear to be accurately characterized by it.  
6 Cosmopolitans may of course consider the state relevant to the application of those principles—or, in 
G.A. Cohen’s (2003) words, to the design of “rules of regulation.” 
7 In the literature we address, these are usually liberal-egalitarian principles of socio-economic justice 
and democratic accountability. 
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giving rise to rights-correlative obligations beyond the state, though less demanding 
than those existing within it (e.g., Blake 2001; Risse 2012; Sangiovanni 2007). Others 
still claim that the justice-relevant features exhibited by the state—e.g., coercion and 
domination—are also present, to a lesser degree and/or in different forms, beyond 
borders, and that this generates demands of “transnational” as well as “global” justice 
(Forst 2001; Valentini 2011). What matters for present purposes is that, despite 
holding substantively different views, these theorists share a commitment to the 
justificatory relevance of the state, in opposition to cosmopolitans’ denial of such 
relevance. Our claim in Section 3 will be that the correct position to hold lies 
somewhere within this camp, but fairly close to its most demanding end. 
At the realization level of argument, theorists of global justice set forth 
institutional proposals which, in their views, would facilitate the fulfilment of their 
preferred principles of (global) justice. Interestingly, a denial of the relevance of the 
state at the justificatory level need not be accompanied by a denial of its instrumental 
relevance, and vice versa. Here too, the literature exhibits some interesting divisions.8 
Some—both cosmopolitans and anti-cosmopolitans—see the state as an indispensable 
vehicle for the realization of justice, on grounds of its capacity to apportion and 
enforce rights and responsibilities, and to mobilize individuals’ sense of justice (see, 
e.g., Ypi 2012; Goodin 1988; Stilz 2009). Others, by contrast, perceive the state as we 
know it as an obstacle to the realization of global justice, and recommend its radical 
reform or replacement with vertical and horizontal systems of dispersals of 
sovereignty, or with global democratic decision-making structures (see, e.g., Pogge 
1992; Kuper 2000; Macdonald 2008; Bohman 2007; Archibugi 2008; Cabrera 2004).  
This brief sketch has hopefully provided readers with a flavour of the 
complexity of the debate on global justice, and the roles the state plays in it. But what 
conceptualizations of the state underpin those various roles? And which appeals to the 
state are successful, and which ones are not? The remainder of the chapter answers 
these questions, focusing first on the roles that the state plays at the justificatory level 
(Section 3), and then at the level of realization (Section 4). 
 
3. Justification, global justice, and the state 
As we have already mentioned, from a justificatory perspective, the state has been 
invoked by theorists of global justice—mostly of an anti-cosmopolitan disposition—
in the following roles or capacities: 
 
i. as a ground of justice (G)—in general, or in relation to egalitarian principles 
(i.e., principles with a particular object O) 
ii. as an agent/bearer of duties of justice (D) 
iii. as a recipient of justice/right-holder (R) 
 
We discuss each in turn. 
 
3.1 The state and the grounds of justice 
By the “grounds of justice” we mean “the reasons why claims of justice apply to a 
particular population” (Risse 2012, 2). In recent years, participants in the global-
justice debate have appealed to state membership as a relevant ground for the 
application of egalitarian principles of justice in particular (see, e.g., Nagel 2005; 																																																								
8 These differences are, however, less stark than those we encounter at the justificatory level. Very few 
would hold that the state has absolutely no role to play when it comes to the realization of justice. 
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Blake 2001; Sangiovanni 2007; Risse 2006). While sharing the conclusion that 
egalitarian justice only applies domestically, these theorists have reached it through 
different lines of argument. Two are particularly prominent in the literature, and 
articulated in their best-known forms by Michael Blake (2001) and Andrea 
Sangiovanni (2007).9  
According to Blake, there are two fundamental grounds of justice. One is 
humanity: everybody is entitled to the necessary means to lead an autonomous life 
simply in virtue of being a person. Since this only requires having enough to 
formulate and pursue a life-plan, humanity generates principles that are global in 
scope, yet only sufficientarian in content. Blake’s second ground of justice is state 
coercion. He observes that some of the resources necessary for individuals to be able 
to lead autonomous lives—such as the rule of law, food security, basic health care and 
education—can only be delivered through the coercive apparatus of the state (Blake 
2001, 280). Yet state coercion triggers additional justificatory requirements, because 
it is prima facie problematic from the viewpoint of autonomy: it appears to “bend the 
will” of its targets, thereby preventing them from being genuinely self-determining. 
For Blake, state coercion can be made fully compatible with autonomy only if it is 
exercised in line with egalitarian standards of justice (Blake 2001, 293). Specifically, 
to qualify as just, coercive institutions must: (i) grant all subjects equal access to basic 
freedoms and socio-economic goods, thereby equally protecting everyone’s material 
conditions for autonomy; and (ii) be under all subjects’ equal control, thereby 
ensuring that subjects “coerce themselves.” Since the function of egalitarian justice is 
to render state coercion fully compatible with autonomy, there is no reason for 
egalitarian justice to apply when such coercion is absent.  
Like Blake, Sangiovanni (2007) holds that the state is the key site of 
application of egalitarian justice, but not due to its coercive nature. As he illustrates, if 
a functioning state were temporarily to lose its coercive capacity, we would not think 
that egalitarian obligations among its members would thereby automatically vanish 
(Sangiovanni 2007, 10–11). In order to understand why it is that members of the same 
state have egalitarian obligations towards one another, he argues, we must concentrate 
on what the state does, rather than on how it does it (i.e., the coercion it exercises 
along the way). The point of the state, in Sangiovanni’s view, is to enable the kind of 
social cooperation crucial to produce the collective goods necessary for—what Blake 
would call—an autonomous life. Sangiovanni then goes on to argue that, for such 
social cooperation to embody genuine reciprocity, rather than be exploitative, its 
benefits and burdens must be distributed along egalitarian lines (Sangiovanni 2007, 
26).   
 Blake and Sangiovanni give us different—though arguably compatible, and 
mutually reinforcing (cf. Risse 2006)—reasons for regarding the state as a privileged 
site of egalitarian justice. But what conceptualizations of the state do they employ? 
Since their discussions are opaque in this respect, our observations are somewhat 
conjectural. To the extent that, as it is often assumed, only agents have the ability to 
coerce—i.e., to issue commands backed by the threat of sanctions—Blake’s view 
appears to (implicitly) presuppose an agential perspective on the state. Sangiovanni’s, 
by contrast, seems to conceptualize the state as both a set of institutions embodying 
																																																								
9 Nagel’s (2005) work is of course also much-discussed, but somewhat less transparent in its 
underlying normative rationale (which includes reference to coercion, authority and co-authorship). We 
thus do not directly address it in our discussion. For a critical analysis of Nagel, see, e.g., Julius (2006). 
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particular patters of cooperation, and an agent with distinctive “extractive, regulative, 
and distributive capacities” (Sangiovanni 2007, 20).  
If these observations are correct, those aspects of Blake’s and Sangiovanni’s 
arguments that presuppose an agential perspective on the state are susceptible to 
criticism on the part of those who reject the idea of collective agency. For present 
purposes, we shall not challenge the notion of group agency, or the role it might play 
in Blake’s and Sangiovanni’s views; instead, we only emphasize the need for theorists 
who regard the state as justificatorily significant to be more explicit about their 
conceptualizations of it, and what follows from them. 
 More importantly, does treating the state as justificatorily significant—
independently of how it is conceptualized—succeed in restricting the scope of 
egalitarian justice to the domestic arena? There already exists a rich literature on this 
issue. Several authors have pointed out that more work needs to be done to 
demonstrate that state coercion and domestic cooperation are necessary—or even 
sufficient—to ground egalitarian justice, let alone to limit its reach to the domestic 
arena (see, e.g., Abizadeh 2007; Caney 2008; C. Barry and Valentini 2009; Cavallero 
2010). Our aim in what follows is not to review this literature, but to suggest that 
Blake’s and Sangiovanni’s premises, which we grant for argument’s sake, do not 
vindicate statist conclusions, i.e., they do not vindicate confining egalitarian justice to 
the state. Rather, those premises, coupled with plausible empirical observations, push 
us towards a more nuanced picture of justice beyond borders, one situated somewhere 
between statism and cosmopolitanism. What we offer, then, is a modest internal 
critique of the statist conclusions allegedly following from Blake’s and Sangiovanni’s 
views.10 
Our internal critique begins with the simple—and frequently made—
observation that coercion and cooperation have fuzzy contours in a globalized world. 
This applies not only to coercion and social cooperation simpliciter, but specifically to 
those forms of autonomy-enabling coercion and cooperation that Blake and 
Sangiovanni regard as grounds of egalitarian justice. States still constitute crucial 
areas of concentration of these phenomena, but the scopes of both Blake’s coercion 
and Sangiovanni’s social cooperation do not perfectly coincide with their borders.  
Let us start with Blake’s coercion-based statism. Blake argues that exercising 
coercion over people and yet affecting them unequally, or not giving them equal 
control over the forms of coercion they are subjected to, is equivalent to 
disenfranchising them. In Blake’s words, domestic socio-economic inequality is “like 
a denial of suffrage” (Blake 2001, 295). Recall that, on his view, state coercion is (i) 
required to secure the means that are necessary for autonomy, and (ii) justified only if 
its exercise satisfies demanding egalitarian standards. Blake, however, seems to 
presuppose, rather than establish, that the kind of coercion that matters (namely the 
one that is will-bending, yet necessary for autonomy) only happens within state 
borders. We shall provide a couple of examples to show that, in the world as it is 
today, (i) the state is not the only “provider” of the relevant autonomy-enabling 
coercion and (ii) many states do not have the capacity—hence the duty—to coerce 
their populations in line with egalitarian standards. In other words, we can be both 
enfranchised or disenfranchised, in Blake’s specific sense, by coercion other than 
state coercion.  
																																																								
10 For an external critique, which denies that coercion and/or cooperation are either necessary or 
sufficient grounds of egalitarian justice, see Caney (2008). 
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Regarding (i), consider the following three cases. For members of the Council 
of Europe, ultimate protection against human rights violations is granted by the 
European Court of Human Rights. For EU market actors, a system of reliable 
expectations and non-discrimination in the market is ultimately guaranteed by the 
enforcement of EU competition and non-discrimination law. Similar remarks, finally, 
can be made about the common currency in the Eurozone. In sum, three different 
kinds of (a) supranational, yet not fully global institutions exercise coercive power to 
guarantee certain goods that are necessary for autonomy, yet (b) each of them in 
certain limited (and different) areas only. What seems to follow, for the coercion 
view, is neither statism nor cosmopolitanism, but a more complex view. The 
necessary means for autonomy seem to come from different sources, rather than from 
the state only, depending on the different institutional web in which we are involved 
(Council of Europe, EU, Eurozone). What would seem to follow from Blake’s 
account is that the individual citizens of member-states of these three institutions are 
entitled to egalitarian standards, not across the board, but in those areas where they 
are subject to the same forms of coercion. Greeks, for instance, would be entitled, not 
to the same overall standards of living as Germans, but (a) to an equal share of the 
burdens and benefits of having a common currency, and (b) to an equal control over 
the conditions of the Euro governance itself.  
Regarding (ii), it is not clear that states have the capacity to secure demanding 
egalitarian standards of socio-economic and political justice for their citizenry. Take, 
again, the case of the Euro governance. If the regime of austerity continues, several 
member-states will have little capacity to implement those redistributive policies that 
are necessary to realize domestic equality. In these cases, state coercion does not meet 
the standards set by Blake for domestic justice, yet the reasons why this is the case are 
not themselves entirely domestic. Again, it seems that part of what justice requires in 
those cases is an adjustment at the Eurozone level so as to give member states the 
power to comply with their obligations of domestic justice.11 Since “ought implies 
can,” individual states, qua collective agents, cannot be under an obligation to secure 
full-blown equality—as Blake would have it—if they do not have the capacity to do 
so.12  
Structurally similar remarks can be made in relation to Sangiovanni’s 
cooperation-based view. Sangiovanni argues that egalitarian demands stem from 
social cooperation in the production of goods necessary for autonomy, including the 
rule of law, safety, security, and a reliable system of expectations. Yet, for reasons 
similar to those we have mentioned with respect to coercion, it is neither clear that, 
today, (i) all of these goods are always provided via state-based cooperation, nor that 
(ii) states have full capacity to produce these goods. With respect to (i), Sangiovanni 
himself has acknowledged this point, by developing, for instance, an account of the 
intermediate obligations of social justice which hold within the EU (Sangiovanni 
2013). With respect to (ii), several transnational dynamics—such as global 
financialization, the global nature of production chains, or international tax 
competition—arguably constrain the capacity of states and their members to secure an 
egalitarian distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation (Dietsch and 																																																								
11 For a coercion-based account of justice beyond borders more explicitly sensitive to these nuances, 
and which controversially regards non-agential systems of rules as also coercive, see Valentini (2011). 
12 Blake argues that coercion exercised by international institutions is indirect and less comprehensive, 
and therefore less problematic (Blake 2001, 280). If our picture is correct, however, we live in a world 
in which different forms of justice-relevant coercion occur in different loci, making the state a 
particularly significant node of concentration, but not qualitatively unique. 
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Rixen 2014). Once again, if “ought implies can,” states cannot plausibly be under an 
obligation to secure egalitarian justice; not until their capacity to fulfill egalitarian 
demands has been restored. In Sangiovanni’s own words, equality as a demand of 
justice only applies to institutions with “autonomous distributive, extractive, and 
regulative capacities” (Sangiovanni 2007, 22). Our point is that, today, many states 
have those capacities eroded “from the outside.” 
If our analysis is correct, the two most prominent appeals to the state as a 
ground of egalitarian justice provide reasons to assign a special, but not exclusive, 
role to states at the justificatory level of argument. In particular, such appeals fail to 
vindicate “statist” conclusions—according to which egalitarian justice applies only 
domestically—pointing instead towards more nuanced approaches.   
 
3.2 The state as a bearer of duties of justice  
Some theorists explicitly appeal to the state as a uniquely capable bearer of 
demanding duties of egalitarian justice to rebut cosmopolitan—i.e., “global 
egalitarian”—conclusions. These theorists point out that principles of justice prescribe 
securing complex patterns of entitlements within given populations. They further note 
that only particular kinds of agents or entities have the capacity to act on those 
principles. These must be agents epistemically and socially powerful enough to 
foresee, and correct for, the cumulative effects of many people’s actions. Yet only 
large-scale, authoritative institutional agents have this ability, since “[…] authoritative 
institutions can preserve patterns of distribution and individuals cannot. They are able 
to do this because they can assign duties and responsibilities that are not assignable in 
the absence of an authority” (Meckled-Garcia 2008, 255; cf. Nagel 2005). Rawls 
(2013, 266) himself is fully aware of the fact that the cumulative consequences of the 
actions and transactions of a large number of agents “are often so far in the future, or 
so indirect, that the attempt to forestall them by restrictive rules that apply to 
individuals would be an excessive if not an impossible burden.” These consequences 
can only be regulated, and certain patterns of entitlements maintained—what Rawls 
calls “background justice”—by complex institutional agents.  
Crucially for our purposes, while agents with the relevant capacities exist at 
the domestic level, in the form of states, they do not exist at the global level. And 
since “ought implies can,” the absence of agents capable of acting on the demands of 
egalitarian justice beyond the state means that those demands do not apply at the 
global level. As Meckled-Garcia puts it: 
 
[P]utative, properly cosmopolitan principles, demanding background adjustment in 
line with a domestic conception of justice, are incomplete due to our inability to 
identify a relevant agency […] (Meckled-Garcia 2008, 267 emphasis added).  
 
The incompleteness can be easily illustrated by reference to our four-place relation.  
 
Right-holder (R) is entitled to certain objects (O) against duty-bearer (D) on 
grounds (G). 
 
Cosmopolitan egalitarians argue that all human beings (R) are entitled to equal access 
to socio-economic goods (O) on a variety of grounds (G). But Meckled-Garcia and 
others object that there is no agent who can plausibly occupy the position of a duty-
bearer (D), because no agent (or set of agents) has the ability to secure equal access to 
socio-economic goods worldwide. Cosmopolitan principles of justice are thus 
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incomplete because one of the relevant parameters in our four-place relation remains 
empty.  
Importantly, proponents of this argument acknowledge that some principles of 
justice apply beyond the state, but these are only either (i) interactional principles 
which each and every state, conceived as an agent, can abide by (e.g., mutual respect 
and assistance) or (ii) institutional principles which existing supranational institutions 
have the power to comply with (such as fair rules of trade with respect to the WTO). 
For both the above demands of justice, putative duty-bearers can be identified, but not 
for the fulfillment of demanding egalitarian standards between all individuals across 
the globe. 
 What to say about this line of argument? First of all, it is worth pointing out 
that it relies on an agential, as opposed to institutional, conceptualization of the state. 
This, in turn, means that those who find the somewhat controversial idea of group 
agency problematic will not be persuaded by it. As anticipated, here we are not 
challenging the idea of group agency. So, granted collective agency, does the role of 
the state as uniquely capable of securing the demands of egalitarian socio-economic 
justice genuinely undermine cosmopolitan principles? In what follows, we suggest 
that it does so only to a limited extent—thereby reinforcing the conclusion reached in 
the previous sub-section. In particular, we rely on two arguments.  
The first concedes the premise that domestic states are uniquely capable of 
securing demanding egalitarian justice for their citizens, and that no equivalent agent 
exists at the global level. This concession does indeed lead to the conclusion that 
cosmopolitan principles of global justice, in the world as it is today, do not have 
immediate normative force. That is, they do not set forth immediately action-guiding 
prescriptions, since there is no agent capable of acting on those prescriptions. From 
this it follows that, strictly speaking, nobody has the rights set out by cosmopolitan 
principles because rights consist in duties owed to particular others, and the relevant 
duty bearers do not exist. However, granting that cosmopolitan principles of justice 
do not have direct normative force does not invalidate their evaluative role (on this 
distinction see Gilabert 2011; Gheaus 2013).13  
Instead of prescribing what agents ought to do, cosmopolitan theories enable 
us to evaluate states of affairs. Of course, evaluating states of affairs as regrettable is 
not enough to condemn them as “unjust,” if injustice is defined as the violation of 
rights. Yet, despite not being directly action-guiding, evaluative statements are still 
informative. For instance, in the case of cosmopolitanism, they tell us that the absence 
of an agent capable of realizing global egalitarian justice is morally regrettable. 
What is more—and this brings us to our second argument—the “no duty-
bearer, no injustice” view must be qualified in non-trivial ways to remain plausible. 
We have already alluded to how it is not at all clear that the state, in an increasingly 
globalized world, is genuinely capable of performing its justice-tasks for its own 
citizens. What we might call global background injustice erodes state sovereignty and 
renders states increasingly unable to secure some of their citizens’ most important 
rights (Ronzoni 2009). The global financial crisis of 2008 is clear evidence of this, 
and so are globally harmful phenomena such as tax competition (Dietsch and Rixen 
2014), financial volatility (Wollner 2014) and the transnational, fragmented character 
of global production chains. States are increasingly challenged in their capacity to 																																																								
13 Incidentally, the evaluative understanding of “justice” seems to be what G.A. Cohen (2003, 243) has 
in mind when he asserts the importance of political philosophy even when this makes “no practical 
difference.” 
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maintain just socio-economic patterns at the domestic level, and these challenges have 
global causes over which individual states, by themselves, have little if no control. 
This is a standard case of background socio-economic injustice.  
Similar observations can be made about the procedural (“political”) side of 
justice—which is somewhat less emphasized in the mainstream “global-justice” 
literature. Specifically, as a result of these global dynamics, states are pressurized into 
being more responsive to global financial markets, rating agencies, multinationals, 
and international organizations championing austerity-based reforms, and less to their 
own citizens through mechanisms of accountability and legitimation (democratic or 
otherwise). Under these circumstances, the same argument that renders egalitarian 
principles of justice not fully normative at the global level erodes their normativity—
albeit to a lesser extent—at the domestic level too. States are, as Peter Mair (2013) 
puts it, “hollowed out” in their agency and capacity (see also Mair 2009; Ronzoni 
2012; Laborde and Ronzoni forthcoming). Therefore, if the “no duty-bearer, no 
injustice” view is accepted all the way down, one unpalatable conclusion follows: few 
socio-political injustices “proper,” whether domestic or global, occur in such a 
scenario, for no capable agents can be identified as the bearers of duties we routinely 
regard as a matter of justice. This would imply that justice can do little work where it 
is most needed. The critical capacity of the very notion of justice would be seriously 
undermined. 
There is, however, a possible compromise that might allow us both to use the 
language of justice in cases where no fully capable agents exist and to retain a not 
merely evaluative understanding of this notion. Interestingly, the possibility of such 
compromise is forestalled by the examples we have just offered. If the brief analysis 
sketched above is correct, global institutions are needed to address global dynamics 
like harmful tax competition, the volatility of global financial markets, the 
fragmentation of global production chains and global industrial relations, and so forth. 
This being so, we can say that we have obligations to do what is in our power to bring 
about these new institutional frameworks.14 Such obligations might not have perfect 
contours, but they certainly constrain the set of actions we may permissibly perform 
in a number of ways (cf. Abizadeh 2007; C. Barry and Valentini 2009, 497–98; 
Valentini 2011, 103–104).15 
We can thus again conclude that an emphasis on the state, this time as an 
agent of justice, is less effective than statists believe in limiting the reach of 
(egalitarian) socio-economic and political justice to the domestic realm. The claim 
that demanding principles of justice can only apply within state borders because only 
states are capable of acting on those principles relies on an unduly idealized account 
of state agency. What is more, these observations should induce us to take the link 
between justice and capable agency with a modicum of caution. Whereas it is true that 
justice, to remain distinctive, cannot be a merely aspirational value, the stipulation of 
a fully capable agent as a necessary condition for principles of justice to apply may 
lead to the somewhat unpalatable conclusion that in our world (and in many other past 
and possible worlds) very few injustices proper occur (cf. Gheaus 2013).  
 																																																								
14 Cf. the notion of a “meta-right” (Sen 1984), and the natural duty of justice to “further just 
arrangements not yet established” (Rawls 1999a, 99). 
15 Whether these obligations are sufficiently specific to be obligations of justice proper (i.e., correlative 
to claimable rights) is an issue we cannot solve here. We think, however, that such obligations would 
be more than merely aspirational. For further discussion see Valentini (2014). 
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(c) The state as a recipient of justice/right-holder 
To conclude our critical survey of the role of state from a justificatory point of view, 
it is worth addressing one final position, according to which the state, if internally 
constituted in normatively appropriate ways, is itself the holder of rights at the 
international level. The argument resonates with traditional claims to sovereignty and 
non-interference on the part of states.  
The strongest philosophical formulation of these claims has been offered by 
Immanuel Kant (1999/1797) and, more recently, by contemporary Kant-inspired 
authors (Rawls 1999b; Stilz 2009; Flikschuh 2010).16 For our purposes, one right is 
particularly relevant: the state’s right not to be subjected to coercion (Flikschuh 
2010). If states cannot be compelled, global institutions realizing putative demands of 
justice beyond borders can only be voluntary and state-driven, without exercising any 
direct, ultimate authority. On this view, forcing a state to join a supra-national 
institution on grounds of justice would be a contradiction in terms, since compelling 
an appropriately constituted state is ipso facto unjust.   
What to say about this final position? To begin with, it must be stressed that 
this position, too, conceptualizes states as (moral) agents, and is therefore susceptible 
to objections on the part of those who find the notion of collective agency 
problematic. This is not going to be our line of criticism, however, since we are not 
questioning group agency for present purposes. An assumption we are instead 
making—following the bulk of the literature—is normative individualism, according 
to which only individuals are ultimate units of moral concern. The rights of states qua 
corporate agents must therefore be both (i) ultimately grounded in the rights of 
individuals and (ii) consistent with those rights. Note that this is a point about group 
agency in general. To illustrate, the status of some voluntary collectives (e.g., private 
associations) as moral agents is grounded in their being expressions of some 
individual, autonomy-based rights (such as the right to freely associate). This 
standing, though, is also conditional on their existence and operation being consistent 
with the rights of both members and non-members (see, e.g., List and Pettit 2011, 
chap. 8).  
Unlike membership in private associations, state membership is typically non-
voluntary. Consequently, the moral standing of states cannot be grounded in their 
being an ostensive expression of individual autonomy. Instead, as Blake and 
Sangiovanni helpfully illustrate, their moral status stems from their being necessary 
means for the protection of individual autonomy (cf. also Stilz 2009). States acquire 
rights as corporate agents insofar as (and to the extent that) they are uniquely 
positioned to secure the essentials of individual autonomy. We might say, therefore, 
that conferring rights on states is necessary for states to fulfil their role as duty-
bearers towards individuals, and that their enjoyment of rights is conditional on that. 
Moreover, like voluntary collectives, their existence and operation must be 
compatible with the rights of all. Their enjoyment of rights is consequently qualified 
in two crucial ways.  
First, internally, they must secure those individual rights the protection of 
which grounds their status as right-holders: e.g., access to the rule of law, security, 
political participation and socio-economic resources. If states fail to secure those 
rights, their status as right holders becomes questionable. Externally, states must 
respect certain constraints towards outsiders: they must act consistently with their 																																																								
16 Similar views may also be found among nationalists (e.g., Miller 1995; 2007), to the extent that 
states articulate the rights to self-determination of national communities. 
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rights. Again, when a state can fulfil its duties towards its own citizens only at the 
cost of, for instance, oppressing outsiders, its status as right-holder may be 
questioned. 
 Second, we have established that the state deserves the status of right holder 
only to the extent that it fulfils its duties. But in order to fulfil those duties—indeed, in 
order to bear those duties in the first place—it must be a capable moral agent. That is, 
it must possess (i) an internally sophisticated decision-making structure, and (ii) the 
ability to translate its decisions into “external” actions. In particular, it must be an 
effective agent relative to those areas for which its being an agent is necessary for the 
protection of individual rights. As we have seen in the previous subsections, however, 
it is by no means clear that many states currently meet this capacity-condition. But if 
the capacity of states to secure just socio-economic standards and just political 
relations is undermined—i.e., if they lack the capacity to stand in the right kind of 
relationship with their own individual members—it is not clear that their compulsion 
ought to remain unqualifiedly impermissible.  
Once again, we seem to be pushed towards a more nuanced position. On the 
one hand, states can be right-holders, but only conditionally on meeting certain 
standards. On the other, with respect to their right not to be compelled in particular, 
the empirical conditions to disable it, or at least to qualify it significantly, do obtain in 
our world. Since states currently lack some of the capacities that justify their status as 
right-holders, we need to supplement them with supranational institutions, which will 
limit their sovereignty and therefore exercise some compulsion upon them. 
Our discussion of the justificatory role of the state in limiting the scope of 
justice has hereby come to a close. Our provisional conclusion is that a focus on the 
state, whether as a ground, agent, or recipient of justice, fails to justify 
uncompromising statism, and instead points in the direction of what we have called 
“intermediate” positions. What is, however, the role of the state in realizing, rather 
than justifying, principles of justice? 
 
4. The state—a means, or an impediment, to the realization of global justice? 
The role of the state in realizing principles of justice is as debated as its justificatory 
relevance, yet along different lines. Unsurprisingly, most statists see the state as the 
crucial vehicle through which domestic egalitarian principles of justice can be 
realized (Nagel 2005; Meckled-Garcia 2008). Cosmopolitans, by contrast, do not 
constitute an equally united camp. Whereas some think that the model of the fully 
sovereign state should be overcome and replaced by multi-level forms of governance 
or even by a world state (Pogge 1992; Kuper 2000; Archibugi 2008; Macdonald 2008; 
Cabrera 2004), others see the state as indispensable to sustain cosmopolitan 
allegiances and motivations (Ypi 2012) or as a way of distributing universal 
obligations (Goodin 1988). 
 Our assessment of the role of the state when it comes to the realization of 
justice will be brief, and largely build upon the observations sketched in Section 3. 
Recall that what leads Blake and Sangiovanni to identify coercion and social 
cooperation as grounds of justice is, at least in part, their instrumental role in 
securing, or realizing, the necessary means for autonomy; that is, their capacity to 
deliver autonomy-enabling goods.  
We have rejected the association between either coercion or social cooperation 
and uncompromising statism on the grounds that (i) states are not the only loci of 
coercion and social cooperation of the relevant kind and (ii) the capacity of states to 
exercise these kinds of coercion and social cooperation is severely constrained in 
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many important areas under conditions of poorly-managed globalization. That is to 
say, we have challenged the justifications used for confining the scope of egalitarian 
justice to the state partly on the basis that such justifications both exaggerate and 
fetishize state capacity in the real world. This has clear implications for our views on 
the role the state can plausibly play in realizing justice.  
On the one hand, we already live in a world where institutions other than 
states are necessary to secure certain rights. On the other, the capacity of states to 
secure justice, in both socio-economic and political terms, is severely constrained, due 
to transnational socio-economic dynamics that affect states internally and are beyond 
their control. As already noted, it is therefore plausible to presume that further global 
institutional building will be necessary to address such dynamics, and that these new 
institutions will further constrain the role of states, at least in some respects. 
This means that, even from a statist justificatory perspective, the realization of 
justice requires at least some of those already existing global institutions, and 
probably further ones (cf. Ronzoni 2009). This is equally, if not more, true for 
cosmopolitans. Cosmopolitans who wish to rely on states as instruments for the 
realization of global justice—e.g., on account of states’ motivational and 
organizational capacities—must also recognise that some of these capacities are 
severely challenged, if not gone for good, and that the state therefore requires, at a 
minimum, external institutional support. In fact, many of them do. 
Whether this implies that we should move towards a radical restructuring of 
the world order, along the lines suggested by advocates of multi-level systems (Pogge 
1992) or a world state (Cabrera 2004), or whether more modest and incrementalist 
projects can be sufficient is an issue that we cannot address here. The answer to this 
question will ultimately depend on which view one takes on the positive role of the 
state for the realization of justice. It could very well be that, even if the state system is 
imperfect, states remain valuable instruments to realize justice for the motivation- and 
coordination-based reasons Ypi (2012) and Goodin (1988) mention. Moreover, it is 
fairly plausible to assume that states remain, on balance, more likely to be 
accountable to their own citizens than more complex systems of global governance. 
Finally, the very quality of democratic processes, and ultimately political justice, 
might be better secured within states given, for instance, the presence of a more 
cohesive demos (see, e.g., Dahl 1999; Miller 2010). All these factors might, on 
balance, give us reasons to preserve states as important loci of decision-making. If 
what we have argued is true, however, these are grounds to favour fairly modest 
agendas of global institutional design over fully transformative models—not reasons 
for defending a system of fully sovereign states.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have surveyed the different roles played by the state in debates 
about both the justification of principles of (global) justice and their realization. Even 
though the main purpose of this chapter has been analytical and expository, our 
discussion points in the direction of a family of substantive conclusions about global 
justice; conclusions that lie in between “pure statism” and “pure cosmopolitanism.” 
At the levels of both justification and realization, we have suggested, the state may 
well matter to justice, but not in an all-or-nothing manner. While it is, plausibly, a key 
site of egalitarian justice, it is not the only such site: some egalitarian principles of 
justice also apply beyond borders. And while the state is an important means to the 
realization of justice, it is not sufficient: it needs to be partly reformed and 
supplemented to secure the demands of justice in a globalized world. Whether such 
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“intermediate conclusions” are fully defensible, especially against cosmopolitan 
objections, is a question for another day.  
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